The development of self-representations

1. The development of self-representations Adela Apetroaia October 28, 2004 Reviewed by Anna Floyd and Susan Brockmeyer

2. Why study the self? Historical perspectives Seymour Epstein’s contribution How does the self develop? Future directions

3. The self and its boundaries at at the heart of philosophical speculation on human nature, and the sense of self and is counterpart, the sense of other, are universal phenomena that profoundly influence all our social experiences. (Stern, 1985) Why study the self?

4. Beginning with William James (1892), the self has been viewed as composed of two separate entities. This dichotomy has had a long-lasting influence. Historical perspectives

5. I-self Existential self “the machinery of self” Biological and perceptive processes Subjective self-awareness Me-self (W. James, 1892) Categorical self “the idea of self” Cognitive representations of self Objective self-awareness (Lewis and Brooks-Gunn, 1979) Historical perspectives

6. I-self Sensorimotor working models The situated self (self as agent) Implicit self Ecological self Me-self Representational working models (Pipp, 1990) The identified self (Rochat, 2004) Explicit self (Case, 1991) Remembered/extended self (Neisser, 1991) Historical perspectives

7. Self-other distinction Self-recognition Self-knowledge How is the self knowledge like or unlike any other knowledge? Epistemological questions

8. Executive self: the agent within, with roles in motivation and adaptation Self as an interaction of what one does Self as an explanation of what one does Self-esteem; ego strength (psychoanalytic origin) The mechanisms are not elucidated; explanations based on circularity of thought and regression. Motivation and adaptation

9. The self is merely a theory (and it doesn’t have an executive capacity) This theory has implications for motivation and adaptation. Seymour Epstein’s contribution

10. CEST assumes that people automatically construct an implicit model of the world, or “theory of reality”, that includes a self theory, a world theory and connecting propositions. The purpose of this theory of reality is to make life as emotionally satisfying as possible. Cognitive-experiential self-theory

11. People’s constructs about the self are encoded in two systems. Behavior is the joint result of both systems. Systems for processing information (Epstein, 1992)

12. Rational system Rational beliefs: Generalizations derived from cognitive experiences Experiential system Implicit beliefs (schemata): Generalizations derived from emotionally significant experiences. Systems for processing information (Epstein, 1992)

13. Experiential system Holistic (judging people or situations based on first impressions) Automatic, effortless (minimal demands on cognitive resources; perceptions and initial impressions occur automatically) Affective, pleasure-pain oriented Associationistic connections Behavior mediated by “vibes” from past events Rational system Analytic Intentional, effortful Logical, reason-oriented (what is sensible) Logical connections Behavior mediated by conscious appraisal of events Systems for processing information(Epstein, 1992)

14. Experiential system Encodes reality in concrete images, prototypes, metaphors, scripts and narratives More rapid processing: oriented toward immediate action Slower and more resistant to change Rational system Encodes reality in abstract symbols, words and numbers Slower processing: oriented toward delayed action Changes more rapidly and easily; changes with strength of argument and new evidence Systems for processing information

15. Experiential system More crudely differentiated; broad generalization; stereotypical thinking(Operates according to heuristic rules, often sources of overgeneralization) More crudely integrated; context-specific processes(People vary the rules they use depending on the context) Experienced passively and preconsciously Self-evidently valid: “experience is believing” Rational system More highly differentiated More highly integrated: context-general principles Experienced actively and consciously; we are in control of our thoughts Requires justification via logic and evidence Systems for processing information

16. Descriptive Beliefs about what the self and the world are like E.g.: “Authority figures are uncaring” Motivational Beliefs about means-end relations E.g.: “The way to get along with authority figures is to placate them” (Epstein, 1993) Implicit beliefs

17. The most general correspond to the basic needs (e.g., self-esteem) Competence, moral self-approval, power, love worthiness Assessment of general abilities Assessment of specific abilities The most general are the most resistant to change, and the least general the most flexible. The system is organized but flexible at the same time. Implicit beliefs are organized hierarchically

18. When confronted to a stimulus, the experiential system searches for related events and the emotions they elicited. If the activated emotions were pleasant, they motivate actions and thoughts meant to produce the same results. If the activated emotions are unpleasant, they motivate actions and thoughts anticipated to avoid the previous outcomes. The role of self as a theory in motivation and adjustment

19. The theory of self can be evaluated along all the dimensions of a good theory. It should be extensive, parsimonious, empirically valid, internally consistent, testable, and useful. These qualities allow the self to respond to the basic needs or functions while adjusting to the environment. The more diverse the experience, the more extensive the theory of self and the more adaptable to change. The more broadly and efficiently organized its postulates, the more stable and flexible the theory of self. The more internally consistent, the less potential sources of disorganization it has. The more testable is the theory, the more increases its validity with increasing experience, allowing for better adjustment. The role of self as a theory in motivation and adjustment

20. Needs Self-enhancement (the need to establish and maintain a favorable sense of self) Maximize pleasure and reduce pain Develop and maintain a coherent model of the world Maintain relatedness Beliefs Self as worthy/unworthy World as benevolent/ malevolent World as meaningful/ meaningless Others as trustworthy and supportive/ unreliable and threatening Basic needs and beliefs

21. A “hierarchical organization of concepts that assimilates experience and guides behavior” (Epstein, 1973) The self:

22. Historically influential perspectives (Margaret Mahler and Daniel Stern) The role of affect and interaction How does the self develop?

23. Normal autistic phase (birth to one month) – infant unable to differentiate between self and the world Normal symbiotic phase (1-5 mo) Differentiation (5-10 mo) Practicing (10-15 mo) Rapprochement (16-24 mo) Consolidation and Object Constancy (24-36 mo) “The psychological birth of the human infant” (Mahler, 1995)

24. Despite the success of Mahler’s theory, there is no evidence for the existence of infant’s inability to differentiate between self and the world. “The psychological birth of the human infant” (Mahler, 1995)

25. Infants begin to experience a sense of an emergent self from birth. They are pre-designed to be aware of self - organizing processes. They never experience a period of total self / other undifferentiation. There is no confusion of self and other in the beginning or at any point during infancy. […]There is no symbiotic like phase. In fact the subjective experiences of union with another can occur only after a core self and a core other exists. (Stern, 1985) “The interpersonal world of the infant” (Stern, 1985)

26. Emergent sense of self (sense of organization in the process of formation)– birth to 2 mo Sense of a core self (development of a sense of agency as baby realizes she is an active agent in events; sense that she has separate physical being from mother; sense that has states of being that belong to her alone) - 2-6 mo Self versus Other Self with Other Sense of a subjective self (baby senses that has interior subjective life of her own; sharing of subjective experience even though without language; baby starts to read the human mind) -9 mo Sense of a verbal self – 18 mo(baby plays out events , past, present and future on the stage of the mind) The narrative self – 30 mo The development of a sense of self (Stern, 1985)

27. Interaction leads to a sensorimotor familiarity with the mother affective responses to contingency (routines) and baby’s learning biases lead to the development of some islands of predictability The role of mother-infant interaction: (Waters et al., 1991)

28. Mother becomes the intersection of sensorimotor schemas, and also the input to these sensori-affective schemata Baby’s propensity to extract invariants about the self and other + an organized caregiving matrix provided by the mother lead to a differentiation of the mother scheme. Thus, baby’s self becomes differentiated as an object The role of mother-infant interaction

29. 4-10 mo: interactions with a self-regulating other Repetition of highly organized sequences of interaction and emotions associated with them: a sense of continuity and coherence of self. Preverbal mechanism of storing these routines: representations of interactions that have been generalized. An extended form of episodic memory. Building blocks for constructing working models Phases in the development of self (Harter, 2005)

30. 10-15 mo: shared experiences and interpersonal connection Infants come to realize they have subjective experiences, and they can share them with another (precursors of TOM) : joint attention, sharing of intentions, sharing of affective state, social referencing. Phases in the development of self (Harter, 2005)

31. 15-18 mo: self as an object of one’s knowledge. Infants are first able to recognize themselves in a mirror -> they developed a perceptual model of what they look like that they can compare to the image in the mirror. 18-30 mo: language; appropriate personal pronouns; extended or remembered self. Ability to represent parental rules and standards and to meet them. Phases in the development of self (Harter, 2005)

32. Preverbal event representations lead to to more general representations, to models of the other and working models of the self. These representations are hierarchically organized (mapping onto the organization of implicit beliefs) Bretherton, 1991

33. Schema hierarchies derived from actual interactions with the caregiver: “When I hurt, my mommy always comes to me” “My mommy is usually there for me when I need her” “My mother is a loving person” and “I am loved” “I am a lovable person” “The important people in my life are trustworthy and dependable” “World is predictable and safe” Working models of the relationships and of the self (Bretherton, 1991)

34. Maintains consistency Stabilizes a body of knowledge in a memorable structure Develops through coconstruction Provides a way of sharing meaningful experiences with significant others The narrative self

35. What develops: a set of implicit beliefs (a theory) about the self Attachment relationships and interaction play an important role in the development of a sense of self Summary

36. The studies should be guided by the same theoretical framework Studies should approach the self as a theory instead of focusing on limited aspects of the self (self-competence, self-esteem, etc.) Future directions

37. Epstein, S. (1973). The Self Revisited or a Theory of a Theory. American Psychologist, 28, 404-414 Epstein, S. (1999). Some basic issues regarding dual-process theories from the perspective of cognitive-experiential self-theory. In S. Chaiken & Y. Trope (Eds.), Dual process theories in social psychology (pp. 462-468). Guilford Publishers. Harter, S. (2005). The development of self representations. In W. Damon & N. Eisenberg (Eds.), Handbook of Child Psychology, Vol. 3 (5th Ed.) Waters, E., Kondo-Ikemura, K., Posada, G., and Richters, J. E. (1991). Learning to love. Milestones and Mechanisms. In M. R. Gunnar & L.A. Sroufe (Eds.), Self processes and development: The Minnesota Symposia on Child Development, 23, pp. 217-255, Hillsdale. Stern, D. (1985). The Interpersonal World of the Infant. A View from Psychoanalysis and Developmental Psychology. Basic Books. Bretherton, I. (1991) Pouring new wine into old bottles: The social self as internal working model. In M. R. Gunnar & L.A. Sroufe (Eds.), Self processes and development: The Minnesota Symposia on Child Development, 23, 1-42. Hillsdale Bibliography