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Water and conflict Lecture at HEI, 15 May 2007 Course E 586 Resource and Environmental Conflict. Nils Petter Gleditsch Centre for the Study of Civil War (CSCW at International Peace Research Institute, Oslo (PRIO) & Department of Sociology and Political Science,
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Water and conflictLecture at HEI, 15 May 2007Course E 586 Resource and Environmental Conflict Nils Petter Gleditsch Centre for the Study of Civil War (CSCW at International Peace Research Institute, Oslo (PRIO) & Department of Sociology and Political Science, Norwegian University of Science and Technology
Environmental factors in conflict: Five views • Neomalthusianism: Resource scarcity leads to conflict • Political ecology: It's the distribution of resources! • Cornucopianism: There is no inherent resource scarcity • Institutionalism: Cooperation can overcome scarcity • Resource curse: Resource abundance is the problem
Water pessimists 'the scarcity of water is replacing oil as a flashpoint for conflict between nations in an increasingly urbanized world', secretary-general of UN Habitat conference, 1996 Michael Klare: the danger of international competition for adequate water resources will grow 'inevitably'. By 2050, the increased demand for water could produce 'intense competition for this essential substance in all but a few well-watered areas of the planet' UN Habitat Secretary-General quoted from Lonergan (1997: 000); Klare (2001: 000)
Bases of water conflicts Control of Water Resources (state and non-state actors): where water supplies or access to water is at the root of tensions (no cases) Military Tool (state actors): where water resources, or water systems themselves, are used by a nation or state as a weapon during a military action Military Target (state actors): where water resource systems are targets of military actions by nations or states (these two categories = 91 cases) Political Tool (state and non-state actors): where water resources, or water systems themselves, are used by a nation, state, or non-state actor for a political goal Terrorism (non-state actors): where water resources, or water systems, are either targets or tools of violence or coercion by non-state actors Development Disputes (state and non-state actors): where water resources or water systems are a major source of contention and dispute in the context of economic and social development (55 cases, water scarcity specified in one) Total number of cases: 173 (classification is not exclusive) Source: Gleick (2006), Water Conflict Chronology.
Water conflicts Source: Gleick (2006), Water Conflict Chronology, p. 44 (most recent conflicts). Most recently updated 12 October 2006.
Water optimists Aaron Wolf: • There has never been a war over water since Lagash vs. Umma, 4500 years ago • More than 3,600 river treaties identified from AD 805 to 1984 • More than 400 water treaties and other water related agreements were signed between 1820 and 2001 Peter Beaumont: There is no rational reason to have a war over water Sources: Giordano et al. (2003: 168); Beaumont (1997)
The general model of conflict P(conflict) = f(Motive, Opportunity, Identity) Water is a motive for fighting Water provides an opportunity for fighting Water contributes to identity-formation
Water wars I? The water conflict scenario • water is a limited resource • essential for human existence • increasingly exploited • more water-stressed countries • said to be worth fighting for
Water wars II? Is the resource curse model relevant? • river water can be diverted • and converted into hydroelectric power • mild case of Dutch disease?
Water wars III? Water as a fluid resource • upstream-downstream – whose water? • rivers as boundaries – whose island? • seasonal flows – whose responsibility? • climate change – added uncertainty
Water wars IV? Cornucopian views • water is globally abundant • it is not consumed, but circulates • little water needed for essential purposes • water can be saved - by pricing - new technology - trade
Water wars V? Scarcity overcome by cooperation • treaties: navigation, pollution, water use • international water law • river authorities • general climate of cooperation
Case studies of interstate rivers • The Jordan (Syria, Israel, Jordan) • The Eufrates-Tigris (Syria, Iraq, Turkey) • The Nile (Egypt, Sudan, Ethiopia) • The Mekong (many!) • The Colorado River (USA, Mexico) • The Danube (many, but particularly Hungary vs. Slovakia) • The Rhine (many) • The Indus River (India, Pakistan, Kashmir) • Ganges-Brahmaputra (Tibet, India, Bangladesh) • La Plata (Argentina, Uruguay, Paraguay, Bolivia, Brazil)
Shared rivers and conflict (1) Toset, Gleditsch & Hegre, Political Geography, 2000 • sharing a river increases the probability of a MID • and so does water scarcity • even when controlling for a set of standard conflict variables (major power, joint democracy, economic development) • contiguous countries only • conflict measured by militarized interstate disputes • effect clear, but limited (2 x p of MID), less than contiguity • same for wars as for MIDs
Shared rivers and conflict (2) Furlong, Gleditsch & Hegre, International Interactions, 2006 • countries sharing a river are more likely to have a long land boundary • long land boundaries provide more opportunity for interaction – positive as well as negative • long land boundaries may also provide other motives for conflict, notably other shared resources • Measured all land boundaries 1816–2001 • Conclusion: land boundary does NOT knock out the effect of shared rivers – the neomalthusianism survives
Shared rivers and conflict (3) Gleditsch et al., Political Geography, 2006 • improved data • river data more complete • study includes non-contiguous countries • better data on water scarcity • distinguish between different river conflict scenarios • shared rivers can run along the boundary or across it • river boundaries are fuzzy and could lead to conflict • rivers across boundaries: upstream/downstream conflict – the classical 'water war' scenario
Third study, results Gleditsch et al., Political Geography, 2006, findings • continued support for 'river conflict'; less for wars • no support for the fuzzy boundary scenario • limited support for the upstream-downstream scenario • limited support for the importance of water scarcity • 'basin size' the most important predictor (resource curse?)
Shared rivers and cooperation Brochmann & Gleditsch (2006) Same measure of shared river basin Cooperation replaces conflict as dependent variable - trade - joint membership in international organizations Results - shared river basin promotes shared trade, joint, IGO membership, and alliances For a second study of shared rivers and cooperation, see Brochmann & Gleditsch (2006)
Comparison with work of Wolf et al. • Wolf et al. find no support for violence in river conflicts • but much evidence for cooperation • 'water events', 20-point scale • assures relevant conflict • but - set-up rules out cooperation AND conflict - only bivariate analysis - analysis at basin level impedes comparison
Water stress by international river basin Source: Yoffe et al. (2004: 6, based on data from UNEP and the Transboundary Freshwater Dispute Database at Oregon State University
Three buzzwords • Virtual water trade Producing goods and services generally requires water. The water used in the production process of an agricultural or industrial product is called the 'virtual water' contained in the product. (UNESCO, 2002) • Water footprint The volume of water needed for the production of the goods and services consumed by the inhabitants of the country (Hoekstra & Chapagain, 2007) • Hydrohegemony ' … underneath apparent cooperation between parties, there lies a world of intense conflict and glaring asymmetry' (LWRG, 2007) For the history of the 'virtual water' concept, see Allan (1998, 2003). For a critique, see Merrett (2003)
Future work • Issue coding – the BAR/TFDD data • Global dataset on river claims (ICOW) • disaggregated approach - improved control variables • improved hydrological measures - with river flow On ICOW, see Hensel & Mitchell (2006)
References Allen, J. A., 1998. 'Virtual Water: A Strategic Resource Global Solutions to Regional Deficits', Ground Water 36(4): 545–546 Allen, J. A., 2003. 'Virtual Water – the Water, Food, and Trade Nexus. Useful Concept or Misleading Metaphor?', Water International 28(1): 4–11 Brochmann, Marit & Nils Petter Gleditsch, 2006a. Shared Rivers and International Cooperation, at the workshop on 'Polarization and Conflict', Nicosia, 26–29 April, www.prio.no/files/file47722_cyprus_paper_mb-npg_final.doc Brochmann, Marit & Nils Petter Gleditsch, 2006b. 'Conflict, Cooperation and Good Governance in International River Basins', paper prepared for the International Workshop 'Governance and the Global Water System: Institutions, Actors, Scales of Water Governance Facing the Challenges of Global Change', Global Water Systems Project, Bonn, 20–23 June Chapagain, A. K.; Arjen Y. Hoekstra & H. H. G. Savenije, 2006. 'Water Saving Through International Trade of Agricultural Products', Hydrology and Earth System Sciences 10(3): 455–468 Furlong, Kathryn; Nils Petter Gleditsch & Håvard Hegre, 2006. 'Geographic Opportunity and Neomalthusian Willingness: Boundaries, Shared Rivers, and Conflict', International Interactions 32(1): 79–108 Giordano, Meredith A. & Aaron T. Wolf, 2003: 'Sharing Waters: Post-Rio International Water Management', Natural Resources Forum 27: 163–171 Gleditsch, Nils Petter; Kathryn Furlong, Håvard Hegre, Bethany Lacina & Taylor Owen, 2006. 'Conflicts over Shared Rivers: Resource Scarcity or Fuzzy Boundaries?', Political Geography 25(4): 361–382 Gleick, Peter H., 2006. Water Conflict Chronology. Oakland, CA: Pacific Institute, www.worldwater.org/conflictchronology.pdf Hensel, Paul R.; Sara M. Mitchell & Thomas E. Sowers, 2006. 'Conflict Management of Riparian Disputes', Political Geography 25 (4): 383–411 Hewett High School Norwich, Water wars homepage, www.hewett.norfolk.sch.uk/curric/newgeog/africa/waterwar.htm Jägerskog, Anders,2003. Why States Cooperate over Shared Water: The Water Negotiations in the Jordan River Basin. PhD dissertation, Department of Water and Environmental Studies, Linköping University LWRG, 2007. Third International Workshop on Hydro-Hegemony, Power Conflict, and Cooperation, London Water Research Group, London School of Economics, 12–13 May, conference announcement Merrett, Stephen, 2003. 'Virtual Water and Occam's Razor', Water International 28(1): 103–105. [Also as Occasional Paper (62), SOAS Water Issues Study Group, School of Oriental and African Studies, http://www.soas.ac.uk/waterissues/occasionalpapers/OCC62.pdf Phillips, David; Marwa Doudy, Stephen McCaffrey, Joakim Öjendal & Anthony Turton,2006. Trans-boundary Water Co-operation as a Tool for Conflict Prevention and Broader Benefit-Sharing. Global Development Studies (4). Stockholm: Ministry for Foreign Affairs Toset, Hans Petter Wollebæk; Nils Petter Gleditsch & Håvard Hegre, 2000. 'Shared Rivers and Interstate Conflict', Political Geography 19(8): 971–996 UNESCO, 2002. Virtual Water Trade Research Programme. Delft: Institute for Water Education, UNESCO, www.ihe.nl/about/intro.htm, downloaded 14 May 2007 Yoffe, Shira; Greg Fiske, Mark Giordano, Meredith Giordano M, Kelli Larson, KerstinStahl & Aaron T. Wolf, 2004. 'Geography of International Water Conflict and Cooperation: Data Sets and Applications', Water Resources Research 40(5): W05S04, 1–12
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