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Outline

Outline. Finish last lecture Prisoners’ Dilemma Security Dilemma Structural realism (Waltz ) Structure forms a wedge between intentions and outcomes Why relative gains matter Three types of interactions among states Implications of realism for international relations Review of realism.

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Outline

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  1. Outline • Finish last lecture • Prisoners’ Dilemma • Security Dilemma • Structural realism (Waltz) • Structure forms a wedge between intentions and outcomes • Why relative gains matter • Three types of interactions among states • Implications of realism for international relations • Review of realism

  2. Prisoners’ Dilemma • How structures can prevent actors from getting their desired outcomes • How individuals pursuing clear incentives in pursuit of self-interest leads them to behave in ways that lead them NOT to best achieve those self-interests • Examples in international relations: • Arms races, trade wars, pollution problems

  3. ROW’S PERSPECTIVE

  4. COLUMN’S PERSPECTIVE

  5. OVERALL GAME

  6. ROW’S PERSPECTIVE What should Row do?

  7. ROW’S PERSPECTIVE First, assume Column confessed. What should Row do?

  8. ROW’S PERSPECTIVE If Column confessed, Row clearly prefers to Confess.

  9. ROW’S PERSPECTIVE Now, assume Column stayed silent. What should Row do?

  10. ROW’S PERSPECTIVE If Column stayed silent, Row still prefers to Confess.

  11. ROW’S PERSPECTIVE So, no matter what Column does, Row prefers to Confess!

  12. COLUMN’S PERSPECTIVE What should Column do?

  13. COLUMN’S PERSPECTIVE First, assume Row confessed. What should Column do?

  14. COLUMN’S PERSPECTIVE If Row confessed, Column clearly prefers to Confess.

  15. COLUMN’S PERSPECTIVE Now, assume Row stayed silent. What should Column do?

  16. COLUMN’S PERSPECTIVE If Row stayed silent, Column still prefers to Confess.

  17. COLUMN’S PERSPECTIVE So, no matter what Row does, Column prefers to Confess!

  18. OVERALL GAME BUT, since both Column and Row confess, they end up bothgetting 5 years,

  19. OVERALL GAME BUT, since both Column and Row confess, they end up bothgetting 5 years, even though they both would prefer 2 years!

  20. Nuclear Arms Race BUT, since both US and Sovs build nukes, they end up insecure AND poor even though they would prefer greater security at less cost

  21. Causes ofSecurity Dilemma • Anarchy/self-help structure of int’l system • Lack of trust • Misperception and miscommunication • Ambiguity regarding offense/defense of military forces and actions

  22. Aspects of PD & Security Dilemma • Relative gains concerns • Even if only absolute gains concerns, cooperation still difficult • Role of trust • Role of iteration • Role of external sanctions • Role of number of actors • Role of information • Role of diffuse reciprocity

  23. Structural realism • Structure forms wedge between intentions and outcomes – people do not get what they strive for • Structure composed of: • Ordering principle – anarchy • Relative capabilities – distribution of power • Structure dictates outcomes • Relative gains concerns dominate

  24. Structure as a wedge • What we expect (and don’t need to explain): Intentions  Outcomes

  25. Structure as a wedge • What we expect (and don’t need to explain): Intentions  Outcomes • What we don’t expect and must explain: Intentions Outcomes

  26. Structure as a wedge • What we expect (and don’t need to explain): Intentions  Outcomes • What we don’t expect and must explain: Structure Intentions  Outcomes

  27. Structural realism • What it explains: • Continuity / consistency of conflict across race, religion, time, culture, technology, etc. • DIFFERS from a claim that war stems from human nature

  28. Why relative gains matter

  29. Three types of interactionsamong states • Harmony • Independent decision-making produces GOOD outcomes • Conflict • Independent decision-making produces BAD outcomes • Cooperation • Interdependent decision-making produces GOOD outcomes (in context where independent decision-making WOULD HAVE created bad outcomes)

  30. Implications of Realismfor International Relations • How realists interpret and predict the world • If states are getting along, it’s harmony not cooperation • States, being concerned with relative gains, will not risk interdependent cooperation • States may form international institutions BUT • Only accept rules they would have followed anyway • States may comply BUT it’s because • Rules codify existing or expected future behavior • Hegemonic states force them to • Easy cases of “coordination” games

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