The Cold War at its Height, 1953-1963

1. Young & Kent: International Relations since 1945 The Cold War at its Height, 1953-1963

2. The paradox of a ‘thaw’ and a Cold War Intensification after Stalin • Improved Soviet-American relations – ‘thaw?’ - the importance of avoiding Hot War - Molotov’s peace offensive - Khrushchev’s reformist ambition and rise to domestic pre- eminence - Khrushchev’s commitment to peaceful co-existence - disarmament proposals and diplomacy • Cold War intensification - spies, psy-war, covert ops and propaganda - growing Soviet interest in the non-European world - the strengthening of the blocs

3. Tensions over the future of Germany before the East German revolt • The dangers and opportunities of unification - harnessing united Germany’s economic and military strength - less control through better integration in the Soviet Eastern zone - more control through better integration in the American Western zones • Soviet fears - German revanchism - West German acquisition of nuclear weapons - the creation of a West European Defence Community with a rearmed West Germany • Soviet aims - demilitarization - unity only through a provisional government before elections - preventing the ratification of the EDC • US fears - negotiations bringing divisions in the alliance and - the strengthening of communism in a united Germany • Western aims - strengthening West Germany - West German rearmament - the Eden plan to allow a united Germany to take over W Germany’s alliance commitments

4. Instability in the Soviet bloc: the East German Revolt 1953 • The East German challenge - to reduce the attractiveness of the Berlin gateway to the West - to make East Germany more controllable through rigid economic discipline • The intensified collectivization • The Soviet East German challenge - to make communism a more successful movement by displaying its alleged achievements - to make East Germany more attractive through reducing controls • The liberalization proposals from Beria • The 1953 revolt - more extensive than first believed • Consequences - greater Soviet incentive to consolidate and formalize the division of Germany - slowing of the pace of change in East Germany

5. Instability in the Soviet bloc: the initial Hungarian Revolt 1956 • Nagy’s reforms - against concentration on heavy industry - release of some political prisoners - led to replacement by Rakosi • Workers wanted factory committees not control through Communist party • Protests wide ranging - resentment at Moscow control - student demo in Budapest 23 October spreads to other areas • Soviet troops arrive 24 October after Nagy appeal to demonstrators • As armed resistance grows 25 October Mikoyan and Suslov call for political solution • 28 October: Soviet withdrawal of troops from Budapest

6. The revolt’s bloody conclusion in Hungary • Domestic opposition to withdrawal in Moscow - Soviet bloc cohesion and the forms of control - personalities in the Kremlin - ideological competition with the West and anti-colonial opportunities • New international developments - Israeli invasion of Egypt 29 October - British bombing of Egypt 31 October - US announcement of non-intervention in the affairs of other countries • Soviet fear of losing out in Europe and the Middle East influencing Moscow’s troop redeployment in Hungary - no confidence in Egyptian resistance • Hungarian decision to withdraw from Warsaw Pact I November AFTER Soviet forces redeployed around Budapest

7. Early post–Stalin peace efforts and arms control • Soviet proposals - Malenkov’s 1953 call for an international body to supervise comprehensive disarmament after the creation of the UN Disarmament Commission in 1951 - no first use agreement, 1954 • The American response - 5 point plan Anglo-American plan for arms reduction - Eisenhower’s ‘Chance for Peace’ speech, April 1953 - Dulles and European neutral zones - Eisenhower’s ‘Atoms for Peace’ speech, December 1953 • Genuineness of the Soviet and American plans - links to Cold War ‘liberation’ • US views on the role of talks and the Disarmament Dilemma

8. Improved Soviet-American relations in 1955 • The Post ‘New Look’ position - disarmament and the ending of the Cold War – cause or consequence for the future of U S Cold War policy - Soviet disarmament priorities - Soviet acceptance of on-site inspections • 1955 Geneva Summit and the Austrian peace treaty • Eisenhower’s ‘Open Skies’ speech July 1955 and the reactions in Washington and Moscow • Malenkov, Khrushchev and peaceful co-existence • The situation by the end of 1956 - success or failure for peace progress

9. American fighting of the Cold War through new Hot War strategies • Defining the ‘New Look’ strategy autumn 1953 - the deterrent value of thermo-nuclear weapons - the cost benefits - the covert operations Cold War emphasis of the ‘New Look’ - the importance of allies in the ‘New Look’ • Sputnik 1957 - US hysteria after the launch - its value to the Soviet Union • The Gaither Committee - the hydrogen bomb and civil defence - Curtis Le May and nuclear weapons • Eisenhower and the bomber and missile gaps - The rationale for Cold War and Hot War strategy

10. The 1958 Berlin Crisis • Importance of Berlin - important enough for US to risk general war - centre of western offensive Cold War measures - tunnel for eavesdropping • Soviet concerns over Berlin in the 1950s - western subversion - the flow of refugees to the West - the construction of West German nuclear storage facilities and West German bomber units becoming nuclear capable • US concerns - maintaining access through East Germany - no practical conventional defence for Berlin in Hot War • Soviet aims - enhancing East Germany’s position by changing Berlin’s position in Germany - preventing domestic hard line opponents of peaceful co-existence benefiting from any apparent weakness in Germany and Berlin -preventing West German economic or military pre-eminence affecting Berlin • Soviet attempts to achieve them November 1958 - transferring Soviet occupation rights to East Germany - demanding Berlin become a free city in 6 months or East Germany should be given full sovereignty over the city

11. The 1961 Berlin Crisis • Expiring of Soviet ultimatum 1959 - Eisenhower and Macmillan summit and CFM suggestions - Khrushchev waiting to exploit the new Kennedy administration • Pressure from Ulbricht to solve the growing exodus problem - by making Berlin a free city - by formalizing the division of Germany in a 4 power treaty - by giving East Germany control of the access routes • Khrushchev’s ultimatums - a separate peace with East Germany if no solution - Vienna meeting with Kennedy 1961- intimidation tactic • American determination to preserve the status quo - attitudes of De Gaulle and Macmillan and fear of war - vital to preserve Western sector - preventing any change in Berlin affecting the Cold War balance in ways appearing beneficial to the Soviets • The growing crisis - US conventional arms build up - Soviet defence budget increases - Shelepin’s offensive proposals - the defensive solution with the building of the wall

12. Fighting the Cold War: the US Offensive Strategies • Criticism of NSC 68 in 1953 - no disintegration of Soviet power - no transformation of Soviet ideology and diplomacy - no psychological war plan to overthrow the Soviet regime • Operation Solarium defines the Cold War/Hot War options and the choices of means of realizing them in June 1953 -Teams A and C and the choices of fighting the Cold War -Team B and the nuclear issue • Solarium Team A - the aim of East European rollback but a willingness to accept the means of peaceful co-existence in the interim • Solarium Team C - the aim of destroying the Soviet Union and the rejection of medium term peaceful co- existence • US doubts over an offensive Cold War strategy and its modification - NSC 162 - aim of getting arrangements in accordance with US interests - NSC 5501 • Tensions and contradictions between subversion and peaceful coexistence in the Cold War

13. Stability in the Western bloc: European unity • The failure of EDC • The Western European Union - German rearmament and NATO - Britain’s European military role • The Messina Conference and the European Economic Community - different European approaches to closer economic integration - The Spaak Committee • The British rejection of a Common Market - EFTA and the Commonwealth • US policy to European nuclear co-operation - the MLF idea - Britain’s ‘independent’ deterrent - ‘Grand Designs’

14. Offensive Cold War Chinese strategies: the first Offshore Island crisis • China’s position in the communist world • The Formosa problem - sovereignty - Beijing’s quest for status • US relations with Formosa • Mao’s aims in the First Offshore Island Crisis -in shelling Jinmen Sept ember1954 -in attacking Dachen January 1955 • US response and the divisions in Washington - use of force - role of tactical nuclear weapons • Chinese relations with Moscow

15. Offensive Cold War Chinese strategies: the 2nd Offshore Is Crisis • Mao’s aims in the Second Offshore Island Crisis August 1958 -changes in Chinese foreign policy 1957 - policy to the US - policy to the Soviet Union and dislike of peaceful coexistence • US reactions - the dilemma of needing to assist Chiang while restraining him - the ambiguous nature of US military commitments • Stalemate and compromise autumn 1958 • Consequences • Effect on the Sino-Soviet split - the nature of military force and strategy (Hot War) in the Cold War as seen in Beijing and Moscow

16. Offensive Cold War Soviet strategies and the Missile Crisis • Explanations for Khrushchev’s decision to install the missiles April1962: - Khrushchev’s penchant for brinkmanship and risk taking - to protect Castro from American aggression and assassination - to create the impression of reducing the Soviet nuclear disadvantage - to appease domestic critics - Khrushchev’s perceptions of Kennedy as a weak president • US reactions to the discovery of the missiles in October 1962 - nature of the Executive Committee - the initial reactions and support for an air strike - Kennedy, McNamara and quarantine - the Soviet letters and Robert Kennedy’s role - Khrushchev’s retreat and the secret Jupiter deal • Consequences for the Cold War -increased need to reduce the risk of Hot War and the renewed peaceful co- existence commitment - more disarmament pressures - protection of Cuba