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Outline

Outline. Designing and Writing Secure Code General principles for architects/managers Example: sendmail vs qmail Compiler Prime: Run-time Environment and Program Organization Buffer Overflow. General Principles. Compartmentalization Principle of least privilege

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Outline

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  1. Outline • Designing and Writing Secure Code • General principles for architects/managers • Example: sendmail vs qmail • Compiler Prime: Run-time Environment and Program Organization • Buffer Overflow

  2. General Principles • Compartmentalization • Principle of least privilege • Minimize trust relationships • Defense in depth • Use more than one security mechanism • Secure the weakest link • Fail securely • Promote privacy • Keep it simple • Consult experts • Don’t build what you can easily borrow/steal • Open review is effective and informative Have you applied them in your design / evaluation?

  3. Compartmentalization • Divide system into modules • Each module serves a specific purpose • Assign different access rights to different modules • Read/write access to files • Read user or network input • Execute privileged instructions (e.g., Unix root) • Principle of least privilege • Give each module only the rights it needs • Minimize trust relationships • Clients, servers should not trust each other • Both can get hacked • Trusted code should not call untrusted code

  4. Defense in Depth • Failure is unavoidable – plan for it • Have a series of defenses • If an error or attack is not caught by one mechanism, it should be caught by another • Examples • Firewall + network intrusion detection • Fail securely • Many, many vulnerabilities are related to error handling, debugging or testing features, error messages • Ensure that you handle errors • Do not expose system internals even in case of errors • Stack traces, internal errors, ... shown to clients • Test if your system fails securely

  5. Check security Check security Secure resource with an ACL Check security Application.dll Application.dll Check security Defense in Depth Application.exe [MSDN]

  6. Secure the weakest link • Think about possible attacks • How would someone try to attack this? • What would they want to accomplish? • Find weakest link(s) • Crypto library is probably pretty good • Is there a way to work around crypto? • Data stored in encrypted form; where is key stored? • Main point • Do security analysis of the whole system • Spend your time where it matters

  7. Promote Privacy • Discard information when no longer needed • No one can attack system to get information • Examples • Don’t keep log of old session keys • Delete firewall logs • Don’t run unnecessary services (fingerd) • Hiding sensitive information is hard • Information in compiled binaries can be found • Insider attacks are common

  8. Keep It Simple • Use standard, tested components • Don’t implement your own cryptography • Don’t add unnecessary features • Extra functionality  more ways to attack • Use simple algorithms that are easy to verify • A trick that may save a few instructions may • Make it harder to get the code right • Make it harder to modify and maintain code

  9. Don’t reinvent the wheel • Consult experts • Allow public review • Use software, designs that others have used • Examples • Bad use of crypto: 802.11b • Protocols without expert review: early 802.11i • Use standard url parser, crypto library, good random number generator, …

  10. Example: Mail Transport Agents • Sendmail • Complicated system • Source of many vulnerabilities • Qmail • Simpler system designed with security in mind • Gaining popularity Qmail was written by Dan Bernstein, starting 1995 $500 reward for successful attack; no one has collected

  11. Simplified Mail Transactions Mail User Agent Mail Transport Agent Mail Transport Agent Mail User Agent Mail Delivery Agent Mail Delivery Agent mbox mbox • Message composed using an MUA • MUA gives message to MTA for delivery • If local, the MTA gives it to the local MDA • If remote, transfer to another MTA

  12. Example: Qmail • Compartmentalize • Nine separate modules • If one module compromised, others not • Move separate functions into mutually untrusting programs • Always validate input from other modules

  13. THE BIG Qmail PICTURE SMTP from network from local remote mailserver tcpserver / tcp-env / inetd MUA qmail-smtpd qmail-inject forwarded message qmail-queue qmail-system qmail-send qmail-rspawn qmail-lspawn qmail-remote qmail-local mbox / maildir / program delivery remote mailserver to local

  14. Structure of qmail qmail-smtpd qmail-inject qmail-queue Other incoming mail Incoming SMTP mail qmail-send qmail-rspawn qmail-lspawn qmail-remote qmail-local

  15. Structure of qmail qmail-smtpd qmail-inject qmail-queue • Reads the message and creates an entry in the mail queue • Signals qmail-send qmail-send qmail-rspawn qmail-lspawn qmail-remote qmail-local

  16. Structure of qmail qmail-smtpd qmail-inject qmail-queue • qmail-send signals • qmail-lspawn if local • qmail-remote if remote qmail-send qmail-rspawn qmail-lspawn qmail-remote qmail-local

  17. Structure of qmail qmail-smtpd qmail-inject qmail-queue qmail-send qmail-lspawn • qmail-lspawn • Spawns qmail-local • qmail-local runs with ID of user receiving local mail qmail-local

  18. Structure of qmail qmail-smtpd qmail-inject qmail-queue qmail-send qmail-lspawn • qmail-local • Handles alias expansion • Delivers local mail • Calls qmail-queue if needed qmail-local

  19. Structure of qmail qmail-smtpd qmail-inject qmail-queue qmail-send qmail-rspawn • qmail-remote • Delivers message to remote MTA qmail-remote

  20. Least Privilege in Qmail • Each module uses least privileges necessary • Each runs under different non-privileged UID in four groups: qmaild, qmailr, qmails, and qmailq • Except one as root • Only one run as root: qmail-lspawn (except qmail-start) • Spawns the local delivery program under the UID and GID of the user being delivered to • Always changes effective uid to recipient before running user-specified program

  21. Principles, sendmail vs qmail • Do as little as possible in setuid programs • Of 20 recent sendmail security holes, 11 worked only because the entire sendmail system is setuid • Only qmail-queue is setuid • Its only function is add a new message to the queue • Do as little as possible as root • The entire sendmail system runs as root • Operating system protection has no effect • Only qmail-start and qmail-lspawn run as root.

  22. Least privilege qmail-smtpd qmail-inject qmail-queue setuid qmail-send qmail-rspawn qmail-lspawn root qmail-remote qmail-local

  23. Keep it simple • Parsing • Limited parsing of strings • Minimizes risk of security holes from configuration errors • Modules do parsing are isolated and run with user privilege • Libraries • Avoid standard C library, stdio • Small code is more secure • Plug in interposing modules rather than complicating the core code

  24. Backup Slides

  25. Security by Obscurity … Is NOT Secure !!! • Information in compiled binaries can be found • Reverse engineering • Disassembler: machine code to assembly • Discomplier: machine code to high-level language • Insider attacks are common • Firewalls do not protect against inside attacks • Assume an attacker knows everything you know • Why? • If attacker has 1-in-a-million chance, and there are a million attackers, you are out of luck

  26. Designing and Writing Secure Code

  27. Secure Programming Techniques: An Abstract View of Program Program Component • Avoid buffer overflow • Secure software design • Language-specific problems • Application-specific issues Respond judiciously Validate input Call other code carefully

  28. Secure Programming • Validate all your inputs • Command line inputs, environment variables, CGI inputs, … • Don't just reject “bad” input, define “good” and reject all else • Avoid buffer overflow • Carefully call out to other resources • Check all system calls and return values

  29. Comparison

  30. Comparison with other MTAs

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