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Session Plan. Chapter Eleven: Origins of real estate securitization Agency Guarantees vs. Private Label CMOs and REMICs CMBS & QQD. Origins of Securitization. Securitization: Process of pooling individual assets that are used as collateral, for the issuance of securities
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Session Plan • Chapter Eleven: • Origins of real estate securitization • Agency Guarantees vs. Private Label • CMOs and REMICs • CMBS & QQD
Origins of Securitization • Securitization: Process of pooling individual assets that are used as collateral, for the issuance of securities • Residential Mortgage Backed Securities (RMBS) • Collateralized Mortgage Obligations (CMO) • Collateralized Debt Obligations (CDO) • Commercial Mortgage Backed Securities (CMBS)
Origins of Securitization • Federal Housing Administration (FHA) in 1934 • US foreclosures were peaking, RE values dropped to 50% of 1927-1928 levels • Collapse of mortgage banking industry • FHA was to insure mortgages against default & to require standard contracts • Allowed for mortgages to become practicable investments for thrifts and insurance companies
Origins of Securitization • Federal National Mortgage Assoc (FNMA) in 1938 “Fannie Mae” • Provided liquidity to market, but still no homes were being built….led to VA Program • Veteran’s Administration (VA) • Grants mortgage funds for veterans at interest rates equal or less than FHA • Negates mortgage insurance & avoids down payment requirements
Origins of Securitization • FNMA restructured as government sponsored, private corporation in 1968 • Government National Mortgage Assoc (GNMA) chartered in 1968 • “Ginnie Mae” had explicit government guarantee and was to carry out FNMA’s prior support of FHA, VA, and Farmer Home Admin. (FmHA) loans • Gov’t guarantee was the spark that ignited the secondary mortgage market in the United States
Origins of Securitization • First Mortgage Backed Security (MBS) was in 1970 • Backed by GNMA with VA and FHA loans as collateral • Investors could purchase securities backed by conventional home loans • 1970 Federal Home Loan Mortgage Company (“Freddie Mac”) was created to compete with FNMA & to boost liquidity
Origins of Securitization • Secondary Mortgage Market Enhancement Act of 1984 • Vastly expanded number of financial institutions that could hold mortgage related securities • Origins of Securitization was the creation of Ginnie Mae, Fannie Mae, and Freddie Mac which provided implicit and explicit guarantees necessary to ease investor unease with mortgage debt
Agency Guarantees • Agency guaranteed MBS allowed for viable secondary mortgage market in US • GNMA secured with “full faith and credit of the US Treasury” • Considered to be free of default risk • They do not underwrite or issue MBS • They guarantee those provided privately
Agency Guarantees • Fannie Mae & Freddie Mac are Government Sponsored Entities • Provide mortgages, issue securities using pooling • Modified pass-through: guarantees only the timely repayment of interest and offers default protection • Fully Modified pass-through: guarantees timely payment of principal, interest & offers default protection • Freddie offers both kinds, Fannie offers “fully” only
Agency Guarantees • GSE’s have slightly higher credit risk as they are backed by an agency guarantee and not explicitly by the US Treasury • Agency backed securities lowered the cost of home financing by lowering transaction costs, increasing liquidity,& improving the standardization of contracts • Guarantees also promoted acceptability of these investments
Mortgage Conformability • Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac mortgage conformability standards are set by Office of Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight (OFHEO) • OFHEO sets size limit for conforming loans (i.e. no jumbo mortgages) • Have “super-conforming” loans in areas where prices are higher than the average • GSE’s may only purchase conforming & super-conforming loans • For borrowers outside of conformability standards, their borrowing expenses are higher
Private Label MBS • Issued by banks, insurance companies, savings institutions (known as underwriters) • Government encouraged private label development given size of agency guarantees • Private conduit buys loans from originators & creates pools for sale (without guarantees) • By 2006 private label issuances > agency issues
RMBS & Prepayment Risk • As residential mortgages have the option to prepay, the uncertainty of timing and the magnitude of the cash flows received by the investor are uncertain • As rates drop below the contract rate, prepayment is more likely • As the interest rates on LT bonds falls, homeowner is more likely to prepay the mortgage • Prepayment can occur for other reasons such as selling the property • Just as the reinvestment rate drops, the RMBS investor is more likely to get paid early • And will have to reinvest their money at a lower rate
RMBS & Prepayment Risk • Convexity: Non-linearity in a financial model; the relationship of bond price with respect to interest rates. • Decreases as interest rates fall (& prepayments rise) and as interest rates rise ( & prepayments fall) • Probability of prepayment is inversely related to the prevailing mortgage rates • Since prepayment rates fall as mortgage rates rise, prepayments slow down for RMBS investors just as they desire them to pick up! • Could have reinvested cash flows at a higher rate
RMBS & Prepayment Risk • Prepayment risk is the lynchpin to pricing RMBS • As Mortgage Rates fall: pool pays quicker than expected • Investor loses interest income & gets principal back in a low rate environment • As Mortgage Rates rise: pool pays slower than expected • Investor earns relatively lower rate for a longer period of time (harms their yield)
CMOs • Collateralized Mortgage Obligation (CMO) • First was by Freddie Mac in 1983 • Consists of a multi-class MBS • Different classes (tranches) have different maturities, interest rates, & prepayment risk • Tranches from 2 to 50 • Each tranche has an estimated first and last payment date • To earn a higher coupon rate, investor must bear more prepayment risk
REMICs • Real Estate Mortgage Investment Conduits • Established in 1986 • P&I Payments are divided into various payment streams to create tranches • REMIC avoids double taxation • REMIC is tax exempt • Investors pay tax on dividends received • Almost all CMOs are issued as REMICs
Types of CMOs • Sequential Pay (Plain Vanilla) • Tranches are paid in strict sequence • Known as “waterfalls” as cash flows down to lower rated tranches • Planned Amortization Class (PAC) CMO • Uses support or companion tranche to provide protection for PAC or “main” tranche • Allows investors in main tranche to receive more certain cash flows sooner • PAC yield, average life, & lockout periods are more closely tied to original estimates
Types of CMOs • Planned Amortization Class (PAC) CMO Continued • If prepayment is different than expected, the support tranche absorbs the variable portion of the payments • Can have different levels of priority • TYPE I PAC, Type II PAC, etc. • Higher yields are offered for riskier, more variable support tranches
Types of CMOs • Targeted Amortization Class (TAC) • Structured like PACs, but investor is protected from rise in prepayment rate (as interest rates fall) • If PAC & TAC are in same CMO, PAC receives priority • TAC is inferior to PAC as investor is only protected from unexpected increase in prepayments
Types of CMOs • Z Tranches (Z Bonds, Accretion Bonds, Accrual Bonds) • Receives no interest until lockout period ends and begins to receive principal • Lockout period ends when all other tranches have been paid off • During lockout period, tranche is credited with accrued interest that is taxable (although not received) • These are best for tax deferred retirement accounts • Have terms of 18-22 years
Types of CMOs • Principal Only (PO) Strips • Investor receives principal only, buys at a steep discount from face value • As rates fall, prepayments rise which lowers the effective term of the security • As rates rise, PO investor yield suffers (gets paid slower)
Types of CMOs • Interest Only (IO) Strips • Any CMO offering PO will also offer IO • IO is sold at steep discount to notional principal (no par or face value) • As principal in pool is paid down, notional value of tranche declines, as do the interest payments • IO Strips lose value rapidly as interest rates fall and as prepayments rise
Creating a Private Label MBS • Non Agency backing allows for any asset to be included in the pool
Creating a Private Label MBS • Special Purpose Vehicle (SPV) • Controls collateral, collects P&I payments, & passes them on to investors • Underwriter • Banks, investment banks, brokers that price and market MBS to investors • Credit Agencies • Determine the credit enhancements required • Banks may only hold investment grade MBS • Moody’s Baa3 or higher • S&P and Fitch BBB- and higher
Credit Enhancements • Credit Enhancement is a process to lower risk of entire security within a securitized asset • Without credit enhancement marketing of private label MBS is difficult • Size of enhancement is determined by: • Borrower’s credit quality, incentives to default, size & variability of potential loss, & diversification of loans in the asset pool
Types of Credit Enhancements • External Credit Enhancements • Government Agency Guarantees • Monoline Insurance • Provide “credit wraps’ to bolster ratings • Letter of Credit • Bank assumes default risk by reimbursing SPV in cash • Less common given banking issues these days! • Liquidity Provider • Makes short term temporary payments • More common in international securitizations
Types of Credit Enhancements • Internal Credit Enhancement • Originator provides protection to cover potential losses • Cash, assets, or profits into transaction while taking a lower priority bond • Excess Interest/Spread or Profit • Interest rate paid by borrowers on loans used as collateral is not coupon rate • Must also deduct for trustee & servicer expenses • Deduct more from borrower interest payment to enhance deal
Types of Credit Enhancements • Over-Collateralization • Pool of collateral loans has 5-10% higher par value than the issued securities • Cash Collateral Account • As losses occur, cash is withdrawn • At termination remaining funds are returned to originator • Structural Credit Enhancements • Senior/Subordinated Structures: lower credit rated classes provide protection for senior classes
CMBS • Pools of Commercial Real Estate Loans • Prepayments are not a significant issue here • Due to Lockout period • Defeasance: penalty for early termination • CMBS loans are heterogeneous • Different mortgage styles, maturities, property types, covenants, tenant and location quality • CMBS lack agency guarantees • Typically set up as REMIC with tranches like for RMBS • A-piece investor vs. B-piece investor
Servicing CMBS Loans • Servicer passes payment to trustee for disbursement • Servicer monitors changes in payment behavior • In default, servicer contacts borrower & may pursue foreclosure
Servicing CMBS Loans • Master Servicer: servicing all loans not in default • Collects payment, compiles information • Often is same as original underwriter • Little ability to modify loan or obtain alternative collateral • Accepting alternative collateral could impact REMIC tax exempt status • Special Servicer • Servicing loans in default • Named at issuance, usually affiliated with B-piece investors • B-Piece: face higher risk so should be most familiar with pool risk
CMBS Servicing Conflicts • In default in depressed market? • It may be in “A-piece” investors’ interest to foreclose • “B-piece” may not get anything so special servicer may wait longer than is prudent for borrower to become current on payments
CMBS 2.0 • Tweaking system to generate business • Less tranches now than before • “A-piece” investors now more likely to appoint special servicer • To eliminate perception that investment grade tranches give up economic value at default • Grant more authority to “A-piece” in defining commitments made by issuer • Eliminates “B-piece” buyers from selling their part to a CDO (per Dodd-Frank)
CMBS & QQD • Transparency is needed to revive the market • Disclosure of Debt Coverage Ratio for each loan in pool so investor can better assess risk • More and Better information should reduce price volatility
Problems of Securitization • Much of perceived bloom taken off of securitization rose • There is good and bad in innovation: autos and electricity examples • Subprime Mortgages • As high as 22% of total mortgages, but 80% of these were securitized • Meltdown after “Yes Era” given higher leverage, poor underwriting, government intervention in markets, and extremely low interest rates
Who’s to Blame? • Originate to Distribute • Hot potato approach vs. originate to hold on balance sheet • Ratings Agencies • They underestimated default risk • Investors • They asked for it!
Upside of Securitization • Lowered cost of capital for investors and cost of funds for borrowers • Often better terms than for on-balance sheet loan (non-recourse, 30 year amort.) • More consistent funds availability • Added liquidity & higher origination fees for lenders and investment banks • When done correctly: diversification of investment options & good return on investment
For Next Session • We will discuss chapter 12 on Real Estate Investment Trusts (REITs)